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RELIABILITY of STR UCTURES for the M OO N
Haym Benaroya

Department of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering

RUTGERS University
P.O.Box 909
Piscataway, NJ 08855

A b stract
The subject of risk and re liability for lunar structures is introduced and critical issues are introduced. Our
purpose is to suggest an approach to the complicated lunar structure reliability question , the difficulty being that
the estimation of reliability of unique structural types on a planetary body on which no construction ha.s occurred
has little precedence.

BACKGROUND
Concepts for lunar base structures have been proposed since long before the dawn of the space age. We
will abstract suggestions generated during the past quarter century, as these arc li kely to form the pool
from wllich eventual lunar base designs will evolve. Significan t studies have been made since the days of
the Apollo program, when it appeared likely that the Moon would become a second home to humans . For
an early example of the gearing up of R&D efforts, see the Army Corps of Engineers study [l]. During
the past decade these studies have intensified, both within NASA and outside the Government in industry
and academe. The following references are representative: [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
The emphasis below is on structures for human habitation, a technically challenging fraction of the total
number of structures likely to comprise the lunar facility. The test for any proposed lunar base structure
is how it meets certain basic as well a.~ ·special requirements. On the lunar surface, numerous constraints
must be satisfied by all tlesigns. These.are different than those for terrestrial or orbital structures, as will
be discussed later . A number of structural types have been proposed for lunar base structures. These
include concrete, metal frame, pneumatic, and hybrid structures . fn add ition, options exist for subsurface
o,rchitectures and the use of natural features such as lava tubes. Each of these approaches can in principle
satisfy the various and numerous constraints, but differently.
A post-Apollo evaluation of the need for a lunar base has been made [9] with t he following reasons
given for such a base: lunar science and astronomy, as a stimulus to space technology and as a test bed
for the technologies required to place humans on Mars and beyond, the 11tilization of lunar resources,
establishment of a U.S. presence, stimulate interest in young Americans in science and engineering, and as
the beginning of a long-range program to ensure the survival of the species.
The potential for an astronomical observatory on the Moon is very great and it could be serviced
periodically in a reasonable fashion from a lunar base. Several bold pro posals for astronomy from the
Moon have been made [to]. Nearly all of these proposals involve use of advanced materials and structural
concepts to erect large long-life astronomy facili t ies on t he Moon. These facilities will challenge structural
designers, constructors, and logistics planners in the 21' 1 Century [11, 12]. O ne example is a 16-meter
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diameter reflector with its supporting structure and foundation currently being investigated by NASA and
severaJ consortia.
Selection of the proper site for a lunar astronomical facility, for example, invoh·es many difficult decisions. Scientific advantages of a polar location for a lunar base [IJ] are based on the fact that half the
sky is continuously visible for astronomy from each pole and that cryogenic instruments can readily be
operated there due to the shaded regions in perpet ual darkness. Disadvantages also arise from the fact
that the sun will essentially trace the horizon , leaving the outside work space in extreme contrast, and will
pose practical problems regarding solar power and communications wit.h Earth, rrquiring relays.
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I NTR O D UCTION

This paper examines risk and reliability issues surrounding the establishment of strurtuwo; for hunnw habitation on t he Moon. Some of these discussions have been initiated elsewhere [ l·I. 15, I6). and t Ii<• readN is
urged to look there for the technical details. Human safety and the minimilrn.tion of risk to ..acn•ptahl<'..
levels is always a top consideration for any engineering project. The '.\loon off<'rs !I('\\" rh<11ll'ng1•s 10 t lw
engineering designer. Minimization of risk implies in particu lar structural rrd11111la11r,\·. ;u1d wht•n ;di 1•ls1•
fails, easy escape to safety for the inhabitants. The key word is ''acteptabl1'' It is a subjt•rtin• 1l1·lilH·ration, deeply rooted in economic considerations. What is an acccpl<iblc. lrr·rl of ·'·uflly 11111/ 1di11bilily for
a lunar site, one which must be considered to be highly ha:mrdo11s? S11rh questions go h1'.n1nd 1•11)!;i11P1•ri11g
considerations and must include policy considerations: Can u:e afford lo fail?
Reliability is a specialized term for the analysis and design of sysl<'ms when• fl'r1ain ;1sp1·1·1s of th('
environment and system have associated uncertainties. Thus, design rcquir<'s C'Xplidt arrn1111ting of ('\·olutionary processes which are inherently nondeterministic. This fact makes t'Stima!ion of risk atul n.Jiid1ilit.\·
design complex activities.
The problem of designing a structure for construction on the lunar surfac1• is a diflirnlt 0111•. 1lisrnss1•d
here only in relation to risk and reliability. Some important considerations ncn'ssar.\" in a dc•tailt'tl rrliahilit.\·
study include:
• the relationships between severe lunar temperature cyrlcs and str11d11ral and m<1h'rial fali)!;ut'. a
problem for exposed structures,
• structural sensitivity to temperature differentials h<'twccn diff<•rcnt s1·c·t ions of !lit•
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rompo11t•111.

• very low-temperature effects and the possibility of brittle frattun•s.
• outgassing for exposed steels and other effects of hii;!;h vacuum on slrl'I. all op. arid atl\·ann•tl ni;111•riills.
• factors of safety, originally developed to accou nt for unr.Ntaintil'S i11 t h1· Earth d1•sig11 auil nrn~t rur1 io11
process, undoubtedly need adjustment for the lu11ar enviro11m1•11t. ('ith1·r Hp or tlow11 1l1•pc•udi11g on
one's perspective and tolerance for risk,
• dead loads/live loads under lunar gravity,
• buckling, stiffening, bracing requirements for lunar strurt11rt>s. whiC'h will lH' i1111•ru;ill,\·
=d

pn·~s11ri1,1•d.

• consideration of new failure modes sui:h as those due to hip;h·\"('lorit.r mi1"ro1111•1t•ori1P impa1·1~.

Ma.ny of these considerations a.re well understood in a basic sense, and need to be expanded upon for
the lunar site. Some of these discussions have begun [17], in particular regarding the design process for
a.n extra.terrestrial structure. The quantitative specifics of the above list require massive efforts which are
beyond the possibilities of those resulting in this paper.

2.1

Loading and environment

1g

Any luna.r structure will be designed for a.nd built with the following prime considerations: (i)
gravity,
(ii) internal air pressurization, (iii) s hielding , (iv) vacuum, (v) dust, (vi) ease of co nstruction ,
and (vii) use of local materials. More details on the environment a.re available elsewhere.
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RISK and RELIABILITY

In this section, the key concerns of luna.r structural reliability are expounded. ln particular : What failure
rate is acceptable? What factors of safety, and levels of redundancy, a.re necessa.r·y· to <i:ssure this failure
ra.te?
What failure rate is acceptable? Since it is generally accepted that one ca.nnot economically design for
zero risk, the next logical consideration is the level of a.ccepta.ble risk. One wa.y to begin to answer such
a. question is to study the sources of natural risks to a system in its intended environment. In particular,
examine all natural phenomena and determine the risk exposure of the structure to each phenomenon .
Some, such a.s meteorites of a certain size, can destroy a facility, but occur infrequently a.nd therefore need
not be designed against. Each of these risks define a time limit (in the probabilistic sense) to struct ural life;
these may be independent or corr~la.ted. Thus, the probability of occurrence of a ca.ta.strophic meteorite
hit is a. small risk, perhaps the smallest encountered risk, and therefore may be viewed as the base risk
against which other risks may be weighed. Other natural risks may be ascertained as best as possible,
compared to the base risk, and then considered with.in tho overall reliability analysis.
Next, man-made risks are to be assessed. Examples are the following: probabilit y of explosion of liquid
oxygen tanks, likelihood of projectiles piercing critical structural component due to accidents, thermal
cycle fatigue, a.nd human factors. These can be estimated and compared to t he a.hove base risk. All
these "component" risk factors must be assessed, and, with engineering judgment (weighed somewhat by
political considerations 1 ), acceptable risk decided upon.
For example, let Rm = P{meteoritet, the probability t hat a destructive meteorite will strike a site on
the Moon during the period of a year. Further, let R1 = P{thermal fatigue), be the probability that a
certain number of thermal cycles in one year will result in material failure . Each such risk measure ca.n
be estimated independently, any correlation established, a.nd then one ma.y define a. minimum necessary
design risk a.s

(! )
This will be a measure of the smallest risk necessary for the structure. This actually ma.y be too small
to be economi cally acceptable, but it is a. starting point. When one further considers that structures will
be designed to be compart mentalized and modular, accessible a.nd repai rable, then it begins to appear
possible to increa.se the value of t he acceptable design risk Rm;,. to be used in the preliminary designs.
As much warning a.s possible is desired of an impending failure. The refore, one cannot a.ccept a first excursion failure. Structural concepts must allow for progressive failure.
What factors of safety, and levels of redundancy, are necessary to assure this failure rote? Given an
agr"!<.!d upon acceptable level of risk, it becomes necessary a.s a. practical matter to establish a design
1 Reca.ll

th e cost to the-space program due to the shuttle Challenger disaster

.....

philosophy. For example, what factor of safety do we build into the "lunar design code"? Since the lunar
site provides designers with the most uncertainties of any engineering project, with few opportunities to
obtain experience or data, one philosophy would demand higher than Earth factors of safety. However,
one may decide to approach this question from another perspective. Consider the site to be inherently
high-risk and, just as we accept high risks for test pilots, we should accept a high- risk approach to a lunar
outpost design concept. Both approaches can be justified.
Redundancy is a separate question. Once a basis has been set for acceptable risk and safety factors,
the designer must be ingenuous in the conceptual design, optimizing the design so that overall risk is as
close as possible to the acceptable level. In addition, risk should be distributed throughout the site in
accordance with the criticality of the various parts to the overall mission.
This is a difficult problem, requiring the study of competing structural concepts.

How does logistics interplay wilh cansideralians of risk and reliability~ The link is quite clof.C'. Generally,
one has t wo options when a component or system fails: replace or repair. Inventories cannot be large enough
to always be able to replace components. Thus, uncovered failures will be encountered. Such failures may
have little impact on the safety of lunar inhabitants. However, high risk failures must be accounted for in
any design.
Reliability and safety are linked to the maximum amount of payload that can he hrought to the lunar
facility in the minimum amount of time. This minimum lime la mnximum paylorul dcfi11es the absolute
necessary self-sufficiency time for the lunar inhabitants. During this time, local rcplacenwnt and/or repair
are mandatory to recover from and survive significant failures. Logistic requirements, tlwrC'fore, become
important at an early stage of the design development cycle.
We see how redundancy in design becomes a crucial aspect of the design conce11t. Furthermore, the
concept must incorporate ease of repair and reconditioning. At a more rclinC'd level. this implies that
commonality of parts be a strategic concern and therefore a design constraint.
Consider the following design approach. A large-scale lunar outpost, if designed for som(~ low risk
scenario, would be a complex and expensive undertaking, primarily because humans arc very dclirntc aud
the Moon so far away for rescue. If instead the lunar outpost is designed to higher risk tolcra11ces, mw
which would ensure material safety but less so human safety, significant cost savings wo11l1l he possible. To
ensure high human safety, a second, smaller facility would be in place. most likely in a n ntral arul easily
accessible site. This smaller facility would be designed to support the ba.~e population for a min imum
amount of time, that is, the minimum time to maximum payload. The added rnst of th<' srnallN facility
will be much less than the cost to bring the complete lunar base to those' same liigh standards. Sonw
thought is being given to the use of a long- term pressurized rover as part of this safC'ty net.
1

Are smarl slrnctures of importance for a site such as the .4-foon? Invariably, yes if the "smart.. components are more reliable than the structure of which they are a part. ,\ssuming tliis to he th<' rase.
then, at the minimum, structures must be completely sensored and monitored in ord1•r to ha\·(' warning of
impending failures and problems. Some self correcting capabilities at(' dC'sirahl<', for 1•xampl1·. for irillatahl<'
structures should any leakages occur.
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K E Y UNIQU E I SSUE S of the LUNA R SI TE

A brief review of lunar base structural concepts has been presented. The suhjefl of risk a111I r1•liahility for
lunar structures is introduced and critical issues outlined and discuss('d. Key ideas JHl'S<'llt<'d ar<' that
• before a particular design reliability is specified for a lunar structure. ont' must hernnw aware of the
design philosophy for the project: is it to he a high risk enJea~·or'!

....

• individual natural risks of the site must be estimated, thus· providing a base from which overall
possible reliability can be provided, and
• logistic considerations play an integral part in the design philosophy.
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